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Summary
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a federal government
agency created by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
to protect the pensions of participants covered by most private sector, defined benefit
pension plans. The primary source of revenues offsetting PBGC’s claims is
premiums paid by the sponsors of covered pension plans.  These premiums are
established by Congress.  The PBGC receives no appropriated funds. The PBGC’s
single-employer program has posted growing deficits for the last three years.  The
deficit on September 30, 2004 was at an all-time high of $23 billion.  Currently, the
pension plans of major airlines present an enormous threat to the financial condition
of the PBGC. Underfunded pension plans of sponsors with below-investment-grade-
bond ratings represented reasonably possible exposure of another $96.0 billion as of
September 30, 2004 according to the PBGC. 
An independent organization has projected that without reform, the PBGC’s
single-employer program will run out of cash in 2020 or 2021.  Because of the risks
to its long-term financial viability, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)  has
placed the PBGC single-employer program on its high-risk list of agencies with
significant vulnerabilities to the federal government.  PBGC failure could require a
tax-payer funded bailout.  Major systemic issues include the PBGC’s premium
structure, funding requirements for defined benefit pension plans and PBGC’s access
to a bankrupt company’s assets.  
Current PBGC premiums may be too low for the risks that PBGC underwrites.
Furthermore, premiums do not vary based on the credit risk for the company, asset-
liability mismatch for the pension plan, participant demographics, or benefit design
features such as whether or not the plan allows lump sum payouts.  Sponsors that
have made pension plan contributions in excess of the minimum required in the past
may not be required to make contributions to the pension in the current year even
when the pension plan is underfunded in the current year.  Cyclical companies that
wish to make higher contributions during profitable periods may find that maximum
deductibility rules prevent them from making such contributions.  Under current
bankruptcy law, the PBGC cannot perfect a lien to force a company that has filed for
bankruptcy to make minimum required pension plan contributions.    
In 2003, the Bush administration made a proposal for reform to strengthen
pension plan funding and the financial condition of the PBGC.  Various bills with the
goal of reforming the PBGC were proposed in the 108th Congress but none were
enacted into law.  The doubling of the PBGC deficit from fiscal 2003 to fiscal 2004,
has heightened awareness about the PBGC deficit situation.  Congressional leaders
from both parties have announced their intention to move aggressively on legislative
solutions in the 109th Congress.
This report will be updated upon major developments affecting the PBGC’s
financial condition.
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Can the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation Be Restored 
to Financial Health?
Background
The Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) is a federal government
agency created by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974
to protect the pensions of participants covered by most private sector, defined benefit
pension plans. The primary source of revenues offsetting PBGC’s claims is
premiums paid by the sponsors of covered pension plans.  These premiums are
established by Congress.  The PBGC receives no appropriated funds.1  In the last
three years, the combination of a slow economy, low stock market returns and low
interest rates have left the PBGC in a steadily worsening financial position.
Currently, the pension plans of older airlines present an enormous threat to the
financial condition of the PBGC.  United Airlines and US Airways have indicated
that they may need to terminate their pension plans in the near future on account of
financial problems.2  Delta Air Lines has been able to avert bankruptcy by reducing
costs, including  freezing its pilots’ pension plan.3  But it too has warned that if it is
unable to reduce operating expenses and if it continues to experience significant
losses, it will have to file for bankruptcy.4  PBGC’s problems may not be confined
to the airline industry.  Systemic issues related to PBGC’s premium structure,
funding requirements for defined benefit pension plans and PBGC’s limited access
to a bankrupt company’s assets may contribute to a repeat of the airline scenario with
some other industry.
Funded Status of the PBGC Single Employer Program
The PBGC covers both single-employer and multiemployer pension plans.
Multiemployer plans are collectively bargained plans to which more than one
company makes contributions.  As of September 30, 2004, the single-employer
CRS-2
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 Termination of the US Airways Pilots’ Pension Plan in 2003 resulted in a  net PBGC claim
of $0.75 billion.  The first bankruptcy filing did not solve US Airways’ financial problems,
which had to file for bankruptcy again in 2004.  US Airways has announced its desire to
terminate some of its remaining pension plans as part of the new bankruptcy filing.    
program accounted for virtually all of the PBGC’s deficit.  This report will focus on
the single-employer program.
The PBGC’s single-employer program posted a deficit of $23.3 billion as of
September 30, 2004, the largest deficit in its history.  Table 1 illustrates how quickly
the funded status of this program has deteriorated.  Definitions for the terms used in
Table 1 are provided in the “Glossary of Terms — Table 1” at the end of this report.
Table 1. PBGC Funded Status
(amounts in billions)
Sept. 30,
2004
Sept. 30,
2003
Sept. 30,
2002
Sept. 30,
2001
Assets $39.0 $34.0 $25.4 $21.8
Liabilities $62.3 $45.3 $29.1 $14.0
Net position $(23.3) $(11.2) $(3.6) $7.7
Benefit payments
for prior fiscal year
$3.0 $2.5 $1.5 $1.0
Reasonably possible
exposure
$96.0 $83.9 $35.4 $10.9
Sources: PBGC 2004 Performance and Accountability Report, PBGC 2003 and 2002 Annual Reports.
Note: On account of rounding, Assets minus Liabilities may not exactly equal Net position.
According to Table 1, while PBGC’s assets grew by 79% from 2001 to 2004,
its liabilities grew by a far larger 345%.  The liabilities shown in Table 1 include
both claims for plans that have already terminated as well as claims for probable
terminations.  Under Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standard No. 5 —
Accounting  for Contingencies, when an economic event that is likely to lead to plan
termination has occurred on or before the date of the financial statement, the
estimated amount of the “probable” claim (net of estimated recoveries and plan
assets) must be accrued.
Although the decline in interest rates from 2001 to 2004 contributed to the
increase in liabilities, the predominant factor was the termination of a number of
plans with large claims during this period.  Notable among these were pension plan
terminations for Bethlehem Steel, LTV Steel, National Steel, and US Airways Pilots’
Pension Plan that accounted for total claims of $ 7.5  billion.5  In addition, net claims
for probable pension plan terminations for United Airlines and US Airways (for its
CRS-3
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 Claim figures are from Table S-5 of Pension Insurance Data Book 2003.  Claims are
defined as liabilities on a termination basis for benefits guaranteed by the PBGC less plan
assets.
7
 The “Reasonably Possible Exposure” as of Sept. 30, 2004 was determined by the PBGC
based on the estimated unfunded vested benefits as of Dec. 31, 2003 for those plans
considered to be reasonably possible but not probable terminations.  The PBGC adjusted the
unfunded vested benefits reported by these companies to the Dec. 31, 2003 PBGC select
interest rate of 4.0%.  The underfunding associated with these plans would generally tend
to be greater at Sept. 30, 2004 because of the economic conditions (e.g., lower interest rates
and/or low investment returns) that existed between Dec. 31, 2003 and Sept. 30, 2004.  The
PBGC did not reflect the events that occurred between Dec. 31, 2003 and Sept. 30, 2004 in
the “Reasonably Possible Exposure” of $96 billion. 
8
 Below-investment-grade bonds are also called junk bonds or speculative bonds. 
non-pilot pension plans), estimated by the PBGC at $8.5 billion, are presumably
included in the September 30, 2004 liability figure of $62.3 billion.   By way of
comparison, total claims for all single employer pension plan terminations for the 29
years between 1975 and 2003 were $ 17.59 billion.6
Table 1 shows that the “Reasonably Possible Exposure” as of September 30,
2004 was at an all time high of $96 billion.7  Reasonably possible contingent claims
generally represent underfunding in plans sponsored by companies with below-
investment-grade bond ratings.8  While losses from “reasonably possible” plans are
not yet “probable terminations” and are not accrued for financial statement purposes,
under generally accepted accounting principles, this financial exposure must be
disclosed in the footnotes to the PBGC’s financial statements.  Some of the plans
included in the exposure for reasonably possible terminations can be expected to end
up under PBGC trusteeship in the next few years.  Therefore the large reasonably
possible exposure in 2004 is a sign of possible escalating problems in coming years.
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 Airlines that were in operation before the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act and whose goal
is to provide service to multiple destinations by using large, complex hub-and-spoke
operations are sometimes called “legacy airlines.”  Others define legacy airlines as those
with “legacy costs,” the millions of dollars paid by the airlines for the defined benefit
pensions and health care costs of retirees.  Most of the airlines established since
deregulation do not have defined benefit pension plans. 
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 A 401(k) plan is a defined contribution pension plan authorized under Section 401(k) of
the Internal Revenue Code.  Pension benefits under a defined contribution plan are not
guaranteed by the PBGC.  
Measurement of Liability
The PBGC liability is measured as the actuarial present value of estimated future
benefits to be paid by the PBGC less the present value of estimated recoveries from plan
sponsors and the assets of pension plans.  Both plans already terminated as well as plans
that will probably terminate in the near future are taken into account in measuring the
liability.  To measure the actuarial present value, PBGC adjusts the value of future
benefits to reflect the time value of money by discounting with the appropriate interest
rate.  The present value of estimated recoveries is determined by adjusting estimated
future recoveries to reflect the time value of money by discounting with the appropriate
interest rate.  The actuarial present value and the liability are highly sensitive to the
interest rate used for discounting.  The lower the interest rate, the greater is the liability.
The interest rate is chosen such that, along with the mortality assumption, it produces
an actuarial present value that reflects the price of single-premium nonparticipating
group annuities in the market.
Interest rates declined between 2001 and 2004.  The interest rate used to value
PBGC’s liabilities as of September 30, 2004 was a 25-year select rate of 4.80% followed
by an ultimate rate of 5.00% for the remaining years.  The interest rate used to value
PBGC’s liabilities as of Sept. 30, 2001 was a 20-year select rate of 6.70% followed by
an ultimate rate of 5.25% for the remaining years.
Impact of Older Airline Pension Plans
Pension Underfunding and Credit Ratings of Older Airlines.  The
older airlines9 include the number one and number two airlines in the world,
American and United Airlines, as well as other big names such as Delta Air Lines,
Continental Airlines and US Airways.  The eroded profit margins of these airlines
after September 11, 2001, took a further hit with the steep increase in fuel prices in
2004.  Some airlines are in worse position than others.  United Airlines filed for
bankruptcy in December 2002 and US Airways filed for bankruptcy for the second
time in September 2004, after emerging from a previous bankruptcy filing in March
2003.  Delta was able to stave off bankruptcy by negotiating benefit and salary cuts
with its pilots’ union.  Under the agreement, Delta will freeze the airline pilot
pension plan and replace it with a less expensive 401(k) plan.10
United Airlines and US Airways are both seeking approval from federal
Bankruptcy Court for termination of their defined benefit pension plans.  Both
CRS-5
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 A vested pension benefit is a benefit that cannot be taken away from an employee even
if he leaves the company prior to retirement.  Typically, an employee has to serve a
minimum number of years to become vested in his pension benefit.
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 Section 4010 requires disclosure of the plan’s termination liability when the aggregate
unfunded vested benefits for all plans sponsored by the employer exceed $50 million. 
airlines wish to replace their traditional defined benefit pension plans with cheaper
retirement benefits such as 401(k) plans.  Both have suspended contributions to the
defined benefit pension plans.  Table 2 shows estimated underfunding for United
Airlines and US Airways.
Table 2. Pension Underfunding by Airline
(amounts in billions)
Airline Termination basis
Termination basis-
PBGC guaranteed
benefits only
United Airlines $8.3 $6.4
US Airways $2.3 $2.1
Source: Testimony PBGC, Bradley D. Belt, Executive Director in U.S. Congress, Senate, Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, Oct. 7, 2004.
Under Section 4010 of ERISA, plans with large unfunded vested11 benefits are
required to file information on the plan’s termination liability with the PBGC.12
However, ERISA also requires the PBGC to maintain confidentiality of this
information.  Although the termination liability for benefits guaranteed by the PBGC
is not available for Delta or the other major airlines, public data is available for
another measure of liability.  The Accumulated Benefit Obligation (ABO) is defined
by the Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 87 as the actuarial present value
of benefits (whether vested or nonvested) attributed by the pension benefit formula
to employee service rendered before a specified date and based on employee service
and compensation (if applicable) prior to that date.  Under generally accepted
accounting principles, a private sector company is required to disclose the unfunded
ABO in its annual financial statements, when the ABO exceeds the market value of
assets for the plan.  The unfunded ABO differs from the termination liability for
PBGC guaranteed benefits for several reasons.  The discount rate used to determine
the ABO is different (generally higher) than that used to determine the liability for
PBGC guaranteed benefits.  On the other hand, claims guaranteed by the PBGC are
often lower than those provided under the pension plan.  Overall, the liability for
PBGC guaranteed benefits is often significantly greater than the unfunded ABO.  In
the absence of better information, the unfunded ABO can be used to provide a lower
bound for the liability for PBGC guaranteed benefits.
Table 3 shows the unfunded ABO and the Standard & Poor (S&P) credit ratings
and outlook for the six older airlines at the end of fiscal 2003.  The unfunded ABO
CRS-6
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 PBGC does not name the companies included in its “Probable Plan Termination” or
“Reasonably Possible Exposure” categories.  However, it discloses the criteria used for
inclusion in these categories.  While most of the criteria are objective, PBGC judgement is
also used. 
is a measure of the underfunding in a pension plan.  Underfunding of a pension plan
is not per se a problem for the PBGC.  However, when the pension underfunding is
coupled with the plan sponsor being in financial difficulty, the result can be
significantly increased exposure for the PBGC.
The Standard and Poor’s credit ratings, used to evaluate the quality of bonds
issued by the borrowing company, are also a measure of the financial health of the
company.  The credit ratings are based on the issuer’s financial ability to make
interest payments and repay the loan in full at maturity.  AAA is the highest credit
rating and D is the lowest credit rating.  AAA is better than AA which is better than
A.  Standard and Poor’s also uses a plus or minus indicator.  B+ is better than B and
B is better than B-.  Bonds rated at less than BBB are considered to be junk bonds.
A rating of D indicates that the company is bankrupt or nearly so.
All of the airline credit ratings in Table 3 are in the junk bond category.  US
Airways and United Airlines are currently in bankruptcy and have the D rating.  Delta
Airlines is ranked only slightly better with a rating of CC.  Presumably the United
Airlines and US Airways pension plans are considered ‘Probable Plan Terminations’
and included in the liability posted in PBGC’s September 30, 2004 financial
statement.13  The rating of Delta is low enough that its pension plans would fall under
either the ‘Reasonably Possible Exposure’ or ‘Probable Plan Termination’ category.
Table 3. Unfunded ABO and Credit Rating of Older Airlines
 at End of Fiscal 2003a
Airline
Unfunded ABO 
    ($ billions)
Expected benefit
payout  — 2004
$ millions
S&P
credit
rating S&P outlook
United Airlines $5.69 $795 D Not applicable
Delta $5.04 $779 CC Negative
Northwest $3.28 $349 B Negative
American $1.98 $410 B- Stable
Continental $0.68 $188 (Estimatedb) B Negative
US Airways $0.90 $115 D Not applicable
Source: 10K filings of airlines, Standard and Poor’s.
Notes: (a) Unfunded ABO figures are as of Dec. 31, 2003 for UAL, Northwest, American and
Continental and Sept. 30, 2003 for Delta and US Airways.  The Unfunded ABO and Expected Benefit
Payout figures were obtained from the 10K filings of the airlines for the fiscal year ending 2003.  The
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 Moody’s Investor Service and Fitch Ratings also rate bonds issued by companies and
provide ratings outlook for companies.  The rating scales used by these agencies are
different than the scale used by Standard and Poor’s.  PBGC uses Standard and Poor’s and
Moody’s ratings in evaluating whether a company’s pension plan should fall in either the
“Probable Plan Terminations” or “Reasonably Possible Exposure” category. 
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 For plans terminating in 2005, the cap is $45,614 per year for a single-life annuity
beginning at age 65.  If plan assets are greater than liabilities, beneficiaries may receive
benefits greater than the cap.
S&P Credit Ratings and Outlook were obtained from Standard and Poor’s website at
[http://www2.standardandpoors.com] as of Nov. 5, 2004.
(b) Continental did not release its expected benefit payout for 2004.  The figure shown is its actual
benefit payout for 2003. 
Table 3 also shows the Standard and Poor’s outlook for the credit ratings of the
airlines.  A negative outlook indicates that Standard and Poor’s may further lower the
credit rating of the company.14  The negative outlook for Delta, Northwest and
Continental indicates that their ratings may slip further.
Impact on the PBGC.  If any of the airline plans were to be taken over by the
PBGC, the benefit payout for claims guaranteed by the PBGC would be somewhat
lower than the benefit payouts shown in Table 3.  This is because the PBGC imposes
a cap, set by statute, on the annual benefits it will pay for a participant.15  In addition,
PBGC does not fully guarantee the benefit increases granted by a plan sponsor in the
five years prior to plan termination.  Nonetheless, the benefit payouts shown in Table
3 provide a rough idea of the magnitude of problem that PBGC faces on account of
the older airlines.  If United, Delta and US Airways were to terminate their pension
plans, PBGC’s $3.0 billion payout would increase by roughly $1.7 billion.
In its 2003 Annual Report, PBGC described results from the Pension Insurance
Modeling System (PIMS), a model used to evaluate its exposure and expected
claims.  The model produces results under 5,000 different simulations.   PBGC does
not release the mean or median benefit payout figures between 2003 and 2013
produced by PIMS. 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates that termination of either the
United Airlines or Delta pension plans would increase PBGC’s 2004 fiscal payout
of $3.0 billion by about 0.8 billion.  PBGC’s 2004 Performance and Accountability
Report states that expected benefit payments in 2005 are $3.4 billion.  According to
the PBGC, this reflects payment of four months for probable plan terminations.
Some of the probable plan terminations are assumed to occur part way through 2005.
Assumption of UAL or Delta’s unfunded liability would dwarf PBGC’s largest
loss from one company in its history.  With the trusteeship of Bethlehem Steel
pension plans in 2003, PBGC absorbed a loss of $3.6 billion.  PBGC has estimated
that the termination of United Airlines pension plans would result in a loss of $6.4
billion.  Based on the unfunded ABO figure in Table 3, CRS estimates that the
termination of Delta’s pension plans will result in a loss of at least $5 billion.  The
CRS-8
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 Amortization of a liability means paying off the liability over a number of years in level
instalments consisting of principal and interest.
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 Current liability is the liability of a plan determined as though the plan is an ongoing
entity.  It is based on employee service and compensation to date.  The interest rate used to
determine the current liability must fall in a range specified by law that is based on an
average of long term interest rates over several years.
termination of US Airways pension plans will result in a loss of $2.1 billion
according to the PBGC.
When the sponsoring employer of an underfunded pension plan is close to
bankruptcy, plan participants are likely to take steps to protect individual interests
that further increase the underfunding of the plan.  Delta pilots, for instance,
responded to the company’s financial troubles by taking lump sum early retirement
benefits in large numbers.  When early retirement benefits are subsidized (as for
Delta), a greater number of early retirements than expected by the pension plan
increases the actuarial losses for the plan.  Payment of lump sums further increases
the underfunding of an underfunded pension plan.  Greater pension underfunding
means, of course, greater potential liability for the PBGC.
If the bankruptcy court permits United to terminate its pension plans, this could
set up a domino effect with other airlines seeking to reduce labor costs by filing for
bankruptcy and passing unfunded pension costs on to the PBGC.  While plan
termination is the worst case scenario, the airlines may make other pension plan
changes that could also have negative implications for the PBGC.  Such changes
include conversion to a cash balance plan design, freezing of the defined benefit plan
to new employees or replacement of the defined benefit pension plan by a defined
contribution plan.  The cash balance plan design can exacerbate underfunding of a
pension plan since these plans typically pay pensions as lump sums instead of
monthly instalments.  A steady flow of premiums is an important source of revenue
for closing PBGC’s current large deficit.  Freezing of a defined benefit plan to new
employees or replacement of a defined benefit pension plan by a defined contribution
plan would drain PBGC’s  premium base since PBGC premiums are based partly on
the number of covered participants.
Pension Funding Rules
Section 412 of the Internal Revenue Code specifies the minimum funding
requirements for a defined benefit pension plan.  The minimum required contribution
is the sum of  the “normal cost” (present value of pension benefits earned during the
year) and amortization of liabilities including past service credit and experience gains
and losses.16  Sponsors of plans with over 100 participants are required to make
additional contributions called “deficit reduction contributions” (DRCs) when the
value of plan assets is less than 90% of the “current liability.”17  Companies that
contribute more than the minimum required amount establish a credit balance in their
“Funding Standard Account.”   In any subsequent year when they are low on cash,
the law permits the companies to make the minimum required contributions
(including the DRC) out of the credit balance instead of paying cash into the pension
fund.  This is true even if the credit balance that existed on paper has melted away
CRS-9
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  “For Pension Plans Like United’s, a Healthy Glow That’s Paper Thin,” The New York
Times, Nov. 6, 2004 
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 See CRS Report RS21717, H.R. 3108: The Pension Funding Equity Act, by Patrick
Purcell and Paul Graney for further information.
on account of assets being invested in investments, such as stocks, that have dropped
in value.  Thus United Airlines was not required to make cash contributions to the
flight attendant’s pension fund in 2001 even though it had slid to 88% funding.18
The Pension Funding Equity Act of April 2004, P.L. 108-218, gave commercial
airlines and steel producers breaks in the funding of pension plans on account of the
adverse financial conditions faced by these industries.  Under the act, these
employers can elect temporary relief from required deficit reduction contributions for
plan years beginning after December 27, 2003, and before December 28, 2005,
provided they were not subject to the deficit reduction contribution in 2000.
Companies that qualify for DRC relief still are required to make the “regular
contribution” that they would have to make without regard to the DRC provision, but
the required DRC is to be reduced by 80% in 2004 and 2005.19  Congress legislated
the targeted relief for certain employers with the belief that the action was necessary
to preserve the pension plans.  The older airlines in fact availed themselves of this
provision thereby reducing the funding of their pension plans below what it would
have been otherwise.  A few months after passage of the legislation, United and US
Airways announced their intent to terminate their employee pension plans.
Section 404 of the Internal Revenue Code specifies rules for determining the
maximum deductible contribution to a pension plan.  The Code also defines the “full
funding limit” (generally 90% of the current liability).  Any contributions in excess
of the maximum deductible contribution are not tax deductible.
Reporting and Disclosure
While detailed information is available on pension plan funded status to
regulatory agencies, information available to plan participants and investors is fairly
limited.  Pension plans are required to furnish plan participants with a Summary
Annual Report that contains information regarding the plan’s net assets,
contributions, income, and expenses.  The Summary Annual Report must contain the
current value of a plan’s net assets as a percentage of its current liability only if the
percentage is less than 70%.
In addition to the above disclosure, plans that are less than 90% funded on a
current liability basis (with some significant exceptions) must distribute notices to
employees that describe the plan’s funding status and the limits of PBGC’s
guarantees.
Even when plans disclose their current liability, plan participants may be
unaware of the plan’s termination liability.  While the current liability reflects the
pension plan’s liability assuming the employer’s plan will continue indefinitely, the
termination liability reflects the cost to a company of terminating its pension plan by
paying lump-sums and purchasing annuities in the private market that reflect the
CRS-10
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 Stephen Boyce and Richard A. Ippolito, “The Cost of Pension Insurance,” The Journal
of Risk and Insurance, vol. 69, no. 2, pp. 121-170.
benefits workers have earned.  Often the termination liability is considerably higher
than the current liability.
Section 4010 of ERISA does require plan sponsors with more than $50 million
in aggregate plan underfunding to furnish information on the plan’s termination
liability and assets to the PBGC.  However, on account of the law’s confidentiality
requirements, this information is not available to plan participants or the public.
PBGC Premiums
The primary source of PBGC revenues, other than assets of terminated pension
plans under PBGC trusteeship, is the premiums set by Congress and paid by the
private sector employers that sponsor defined benefit pension plans.  The PBGC
premium structure for the single-employer program consists of flat-rate premiums
and variable-rate premiums.  All covered single-employer plans are required to pay
a flat annual premium of $19 per participant.  Underfunded plans are required to pay
an additional variable-rate premium of $9 per $1,000 of unfunded vested benefits.
However, the variable premium is waived if contributions to the plan for the prior
year were at least equal to the Full Funding Limit.  Bethlehem Steel, the largest plan
termination to date in PBGC’s history, paid no variable-rate premiums for five years
prior to plan termination.
The PBGC Versus Private Insurance Companies and State
Insurance Guaranty Funds
The PBGC is often thought of as an insurance company that protects the pension
benefits of employees of bankrupt companies.  However, there are key differences
between commercial insurance companies and the PBGC.  State regulations require
an insurance company to hold adequate reserves to back promises behind the
products they sell.  When the products involve particularly unpredictable risks
(variable annuities, for instance), additional reserves are required.  Insurance
companies develop their premiums such that after allowing for administrative
expenses, enough is left over to build the required reserves.  The PBGC’s premiums,
on the other hand, do not always reflect the true cost of insurance.  In particular,
PBGC premiums do not reflect the market risk that a poor economy may lead to
widespread unfunded plan terminations during the same year.  A 2002 article
estimated that PBGC premiums were about half of the market price for the
insurance.20
In an effort to attract better risks, insurance companies usually subdivide policy
applicants into subgroups and base premiums for a particular subgroup on the level
of risk that the subgroup presents.  Applicants that are better risks are charged lower
premiums.  The PBGC premium is based only to a limited extent on the risk that a
particular pension plan represents.  The variable component of the premium is based
on the unfunded vested benefit which reflects the degree of underfunding of the
pension plan.  However, the premium rate is not higher for a company that has a low
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 “Moral hazard” is a term used in the insurance industry to characterize a premium
structure that does not appropriately reflect the risk presented by certain policyholders and
therefore  encourages disproportionate enrollment by these policyholders.  The result is
losses for the insurer that must be corrected by a revised premium structure.  In the worst
case, the result is insolvency of the insurer. 
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 Not everyone believes that PBGC premiums are too low for the risks that it covers.
Christopher W. O’Flinn, Chairman of the ERISA Industry Committee, in his Sept. 15, 2003
testimony indicated that the use of conservative discount rates may be resulting in the
overstatement of PBGC liabilities and excessive PBGC premiums.  The testimony was given
before the Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget and International Security,
Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate.
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 See CRS Report RL32175, Insurance Guaranty Funds, by Carolyn Cobb for further
information.
credit rating or a pension plan that has a marked mismatch between its assets and
liabilities.  The PBGC premium structure may encourage “moral hazard”.21  A
company could make its workforce promises for higher pensions instead of paying
higher wages, then file for bankruptcy and transfer the pension obligation to the
PBGC.  The Boyce and Ippolito article notes that the moral hazard resulting from
higher risks not being charged appropriate premiums was not taken into account in
determining the underpricing of PBGC premiums.  Presumably the estimate of
underpricing would be even greater than 50% had moral hazard been taken into
account.22
A better analogy to the PBGC might be a state insurance guaranty fund.  State
insurance guaranty funds are established for the protection of insurance
policyholders.  They are administered by the states and funded by assessments on
insurers.  Upon insolvency of an insurer, the insurers that are members of the state’s
guaranty association assess themselves proportionate to their premium volume in the
state to fund the difference between the insolvent company’s assets and the residents’
claims.  Upon liquidation of a property-liability insurer, responsibility for payment
of claims is transferred to the state’s guaranty association.  Upon liquidation of a life
insurer, the state’s guaranty association sells or transfers its insurance policies to
another life insurer.23
Unlike the PBGC, a state’s guaranty fund does not actually contain monies until
an insurer has become insolvent and participating insurers are assessed their share of
the shortfall from the insolvent insurer.  To date, state guaranty funds have not had
the same financial problems as the PBGC.  This is because a state’s control over an
insurance company’s finances is greater than the PBGC’s control over funding of a
pension plan.  In addition to monitoring that adequate premiums are being charged
for insurance premiums, a state can intervene when an insurance company faces
financial problems.  When a state’s insurance commissioner determines that the
insurer is financially troubled, he can order the insurer to suspend business.  If he
believes that the insurer’s problems cannot be corrected, he can petition for an order
of liquidation.  The PBGC on the other hand cannot perfect a lien to force an
employer that has filed for Chapter 11 reorganization to make pension contributions
that are required under minimum funding rules.  Typically, an underfunded pension
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 The base scenario assumes new claims from underfunded pension plans at $2.7 billion
each year (the level assumed in PBGC’s PIMS model), incoming PBGC premiums starting
at the 2004 level of $1.5 billion and grading down to the historical average of $900 million
per year, and an annual investment return of 5.2% consistent with the predominantly bond
portfolio held by the PBGC.
plan of a  company on the verge of bankruptcy becomes far more underfunded by the
time the plan terminates.
Prognosis for the PBGC
Many of the older airline pension plans were adequately funded in 1999.  Yet
they are all significantly underfunded today.  The airline industry can serve as an
example of how fast profit conditions can deteriorate for an industry.  Some say that
the auto industry may be next in line.24  The credit ratings of the auto companies have
been worsening, with the rating for General Motors, the biggest of the autos, standing
at just above junk bond status.  These companies have expensive defined benefit
pension plans with low funded ratios.  The autos face continued pressure on their
profit margins as a result of global competition as well as the prospect of expensive
redesign to meet new emission controls that may be established by major states.
Because of the risks to its long-term financial viability, the GAO has placed the
PBGC single-employer program on its high-risk list of agencies with significant
vulnerabilities to the federal government.
The PBGC does not release cash flow projections from its stochastic PIMS
model.  However, estimates were recently released by an independent non-partisan
organization called The Center on Federal Financial Institutions (COFFI) based on
deterministic modeling of the cash flows from PBGC’s single-employer program.25
While results from a stochastic model are more detailed and would have been
preferable, the COFFI analysis has been useful in providing rough order of magnitude
numbers and furthering debate and discussion on issues facing the PBGC.  Some of
the major conclusions from COFFI’s analysis are:
! Under COFFI’s base scenario, PBGC’s single-employer program
will run out of cash in 2020 or 2021.26  By way of comparison, the
Social Security fund is expected to run out of cash in 2042.  PBGC’s
own stochastic modeling shows a less than 10 percent chance that
the program will deplete its assets by 2020. However, according to
the PBGC such “tail events” can and do happen. The PBGC’s large
surpluses of the late 1990s and its record deficits of the early 2000s
were scenarios with a less than 10 percent chance of occurring. 
! In order to return PBGC to solvency, while honoring new claims
from underfunded pension plans, it would be necessary to transfer
$78 billion from taxpayers to the PBGC.
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 This amount is $7 billion greater than PBGC’s fiscal 2004 deficit.  According to COFFI,
the difference of $7 billion is attributable to a difference in treatment of future expenses.
The COFFI model includes future expenses associated with the payment of claims, whereas
under generally accepted accounting principles, the PBGC is not allowed to take all future
expenses into account in determining the liability.
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 GAO-04-90, Single-Employer Pension Insurance Program Faces Significant Long-term
Risks.
! The taxpayer rescue amount would rise from $78 billion to $95
billion if in addition to claims assumed in the base scenario, there
were claims from plan terminations of all the legacy airlines.  As a
basis for comparison, we note that the bailout of the Savings & Loan
federal insurance program  (S&L) in 1989 cost taxpayers $200
billion in today’s dollars.
! Shutdown of the PBGC program without any new claims or any new
premiums would still require a taxpayer transfer of $30 billion.27
While legislation could be enacted to shut the PBGC to new claims,
this could be difficult since employees in firms that had paid PBGC
premiums would expect to be protected with respect to vested
guaranteed benefits earned to date.
COFFI’s analysis also quantifies alternatives to taxpayer transfers for solving
the PBGC problem.  These include raising PBGC premiums or earning a higher rate
of return on the assets held by the PBGC.  Large increases in premiums may be
untenable since they may cause the healthiest plans to drop out of the program.
Earning a higher rate of return may be possible in some years by investing a larger
proportion of assets in volatile investments such as stocks, but the resulting mismatch
with PBGC’s liabilities could ultimately result in lower returns on account of the
need to liquidate assets in a down market to meet cash flow needs. During 2004,
PBGC adopted a new investment policy that will increase investments in fixed
income securities and reduce the percentage of assets invested in equities to 15% -
25% of total invested assets.  The investment policy will reduce balance sheet
volatility arising from a mismatch between assets and liabilities.
Many observers note that the prognosis for the PBGC is not good.  Several
leading Congressional members have announced their intention to move aggressively
on legislative solutions in the 109th Congress.
Policy Issues and Congressional Action
The GAO in its 2003 report on the PBGC’s single-employer program made
several suggestions for improving the long-term financial health of the program.28
The Bush Administration made reform proposals in 2003 for accurate measurement
of pension liabilities, increased transparency of pension plan information, and
improved safeguards against deterioration of pension plan funding.
Pension underfunding in financially troubled companies is concentrated in
industries subject to global competition such as the steel, airline, and auto industries.
Some believe that PBGC insurance for pensions may have, in many instances, turned
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out to be insurance for reorganizing in a globally competitive environment and that
the solutions to strengthen PBGC’s finances should be examined in this light.29
Various bills were introduced in the 108th Congress with the goal of improving
the financial condition of PBGC’s single-employer program.  The various proposals
for strengthening PBGC’s single-employer program can be categorized as follows:
Strengthen Funding Rules for Pension Plans.  GAO suggestions
include restricting sponsors with low credit ratings from using their Funding
Standard Account credit balances for reducing contributions, limiting lump sum
distributions from severely underfunded pension plans, and raising the level of tax
deductible contributions.
A key element of the Administration proposal is that pension contributions
would be determined by using interest rates for discounting pension benefits taken
from a corporate bond yield curve (a graph that plots the interest rates on bonds that
mature at different dates in the future).  This would ensure that the calculation of
pension liabilities is more accurate than the current practice of using the same
discount rate for all future payments regardless of when they occur.  Sponsors of
plans with older workforces would probably be required to increase pension
contributions under this proposal.  Small employers are also concerned about this
proposal on account of the added complexity it would entail.  The Administration
also proposes that companies with below investment grade ratings whose plans are
severely underfunded would have to immediately fully fund or secure any new
benefit improvements, benefit accruals or lump sum distributions.  The
Administration has put forth several other reform principles that would also have the
effect of strengthening pension funding.
The Pension Rights Center has suggested that companies not be allowed to use
pension assets for payment of non-pension benefits such as retiree health benefits or
to merge underfunded and overfunded pension plans.
The National Employee Savings and Trust Equity Guarantee Act of 2004, S.
2424, provided that an employer with a below-investment grade rating and plan
assets valued at less than 50% of current liability would have its plan frozen and
could not improve benefits or pay lump sums.  It was approved by the Senate Finance
Committee in September 2003 but not acted on by the Senate.
Restructure PBGC Premiums.  The GAO has noted that the current fixed-
rate premium of $19 per participant has not been changed since 1991 and indexing
it to the rate of CPI increase might be appropriate.  The variable-rate premium could
be restructured based on the risk posed by different plans.  Different variable-rate
premiums could be charged depending on the financial strength of the plan sponsor,
asset-liability mismatch, participant demographics, and the plan’s benefit structure,
e.g., whether the plan has a lump sum option.
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 Nonqualified deferred compensation plans are benefit plans offered to executives that
allow them to defer part of their compensation for payment at a later date, often with
compounding at attractive interest rates.  These plans do not have the same tax advantages
as qualified pension plans offered to rank and file employees.    
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 Cash balance pension plans combine the characteristics of both traditional defined benefit
pension plans and defined contribution pension plans.  Like a traditional defined benefit
pension plan, the employer has control over the investment of pension assets.  Employees
are provided periodic statements of amounts accumulated in their accounts, as for a defined
contribution pension plan.  Employees usually have the option of receiving a lump sum
distribution from the plan when they leave the employer.  For more information, see CRS
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Improve Transparency of Information.  The Administration proposes that
the Summary Annual Report furnished by employers to plan participants include the
plan’s termination liability in addition to its current liability.  The Administration
also would like information collected by the PBGC under Section 4010 for the plan’s
termination liability to be made public.
The House version of the Appropriations bill for fiscal 2005 for Labor-Health
and Human Services-Education, H.R. 5006, was approved in September 2004.  The
version would have repealed the ERISA provision that bars the PBGC from releasing
to the public information it receives under ERISA Section 4010 (e.g., the plan and
sponsor financial information that must be filed when a plan is more than $50 million
underfunded).  The Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version of this
bill, S. 2810, in September 2004.  However, this version did not include any changes
to ERISA Section 4010.  The Fiscal Year 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act
(P.L. 108-447); signed by the President into law in December, 2004, did not include
any changes to ERISA Section 4010 either.
The ERISA Industry Committee recommends that the PBGC disclose analyses
of the long-term projections of its cash flow as well as its funded status (assets
divided by liabilities) under various scenarios.30 
Change Bankruptcy Law.  Under current law, the PBGC is not allowed to
perfect a lien to force a company that is in bankruptcy reorganization to make
required minimum pension contributions.  The PBGC would like the authority to do
this so that plans do not become even more underfunded by the time they terminate.
Reduce Disparity between Executive and Non-Executive Benefits.
H.R. 5292, introduced in October, 2004, would have prohibited employers from
paying or promising nonqualified deferred compensation31 to executive officers or
directors for five years following a shift in pension liabilities to the PBGC during
bankruptcy.
Review Cash Balance Regulation.  The regulatory climate for cash
balance plans32 is highly uncertain.  Employers have indicated that unless favorable
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Report RL30196, Pension Issues: Cash Balance Plans by Patrick J. Purcell.  
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regulations are issued, they may be forced to terminate their cash balance plans in
favor of defined contribution plans.  Cash balance plans tend to be sponsored by large
employers and are generally well funded.  Termination of cash balance plans in large
numbers would leave the PBGC in a more vulnerable position.
The doubling of the PBGC deficit from fiscal 2003 to fiscal 2004, has
heightened awareness of the PBGC deficit situation.  Representative Boehner,
Chairman of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, Senator Gregg,
Chairman of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pension Committee, Senator
Grassley, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and Senator Baucus, ranking
Democrat on the Senate Finance Committee are among those that have announced
their intention to move aggressively on legislative solutions in the 109th Congress.33
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Glossary of Terms — Table 1 
Assets — PBGC’s investable assets for the single employer program, consisting of
premium revenues, assets from terminated pension plans and assets recovered from
their sponsors.
Liabilities — The present value of net guaranteed benefits with respect to
underfunded terminated plans as well as the estimated present value of net
guaranteed benefits for probable plan terminations.  The interest rate used to calculate
the present value is determined by the PBGC such that along with the assumed
mortality table, it reflects the cost to purchase an annuity.
Net Position — Excess of assets over liabilities.
Benefit Payments — Benefits paid by the PBGC to retirees and beneficiaries in
trusteed plans.
Reasonably Possible Exposure — Potential loss to the PBGC from underfunded
pension plans of sponsors experiencing financial problems.  This amount excludes
the potential losses from pension plans that the PBGC believes will be probably
terminated in the foreseeable future.
